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Intergenerational Communities
Abstract: Under the human flourishing theory of property, owners have
obligations, positive as well as negative, that they owe to members of the
various communities to which they belong. But are the members of those
communities limited to living persons, or do they include non-living persons
as well, i.e., future persons and the dead? This Article argues that owners owe
two sorts of obligation to non-living members of our generational communities,
one general, the other specific. The general obligation is to provide future
generations with the basic material background conditions that are necessary
for them to be able to carry out what I call life-transcending projects that their
forebears have transmitted to them. The specific obligation is project-specific;
that is, its purpose is to enable successive generational community members to
whom particular life-transcending projects have been forwarded to be carried
out in their way. The future generational members to whom the project is
transferred must also be given whatever resources or goods are necessary
to carry the project forward in its intended way. I argue further that each
generational community owes its predecessors the obligation to accept life-
transcending projects transmitted to them by their forebears and make reason-
able efforts to carry those projects forward into the future. The obligation is
based on the past generational community members’ dependency on their
successors for the projects to continue into the future, a matter that is constitu-
tive of the project creators’ flourishing. This obligation is defeasible, rather than
absolute, however.
DOI 10.1515/lehr-2014-0001
Introduction
Do property owners owe obligations to members of future and/or past genera-
tions? Although the question can be reframed in rights-terms so that it faces rights-
oriented theories of property, it seems to pose a greater challenge to those theories
of property that directly focus on the obligations that property owners owe to
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others (rather than or, better, along with the rights of owner). The challenge is
compounded where such theories emphasize the relationships between individual
property owners1 and the various communities to which they belong. Do those
communities include members of future generations? This paper addresses these
questions as they apply to a property theory that I have developed in recent work,
a theory that we can call the human-flourishing theory of property.2
In this earlier work, I have argued that our (and others’) dependence creates,
for us (and for them), an obligation to participate in and support the social
networks and structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that
make it possible for living members of the various communities to which we
belong to flourish. My concerns here are whether such an obligation extends to
non-living members of our communities, past and future, as well, and if so, what
is the scope of such an obligation and whether the fulfillment of the obligation is
always a strictly private matter or is at least collective in some contexts. I argue
that we do indeed owe obligations to non-living members of our generational
communities. I argue further that with respect to members of future generational
communities, there are two types of obligations, one general, the other specific.
The general obligation (GO) is to provide future generations with the basic
material background conditions that are necessary for them to be able to carry out
what I call life-transcending projects that their forebears have transmitted to them.
This obligation is general insofar as it is not project-specific; rather, its purpose is
to enable future generations to flourish. It is general, moreover, in the sense it is
the obligation that any decent liberal society owes to its own members, an infra-
generational obligation concerning goods that such a society ought to save rather
than consume. Such goods will then remain available for future generations.
Although many other theorists have discussed the GO, what I add to the
literature is a discussion of the specific obligation (SO). The SO is project-
specific; that is, its purpose is to enable successive generational community
members to whom particular life-transcending projects have been forwarded to
be carried out in their way. The future generational members to whom the
project is transferred must also be given whatever resources or goods are
necessary to carry the project forward in its intended way.
1 Although I do discuss collective obligations to past and future generations to some extent in
this paper, my main focus is on the obligations of individuals. More specifically, I focus on
individual obligations as they pertain to property concretely.
2 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of
Community, 10 THEOR. INQ. L. 127 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2011).
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I argue further that each generational community owes its predecessors the
obligation to accept life-transcending projects transmitted to them by their fore-
bears and make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward into the future.
The obligation is based on the past generational community members’ depen-
dency on their successors for the projects to continue into the future, a matter that
is constitutive of the project creators’ flourishing. This obligation is defeasible,
rather than absolute, however. Persons to whom life-transcending projects have
been forwarded for caretaking and fulfillment must be free to reject the projects
that are themselves immoral or that otherwise unreasonably burden them.
Concomitantly, creators of life-transcending projects, in transmitting such projects
to successive generational members, are under the moral obligation not to impose
immoral, unreasonable, or foolish projects on their successors.
The scope of both the GO and the SO are more restricted than some rights
theorists, such as Jeremy Waldron, have claimed.3 Unlike Waldron, I argue that the
obligations that property owners owe to past and future generations are grounded
on dependence. Specifically, I argue that in the intergenerational context depen-
dency involves reciprocity (and vice versa) and that there are two distinct, although
related, senses of reciprocity at work here. One is a form of serial reciprocity, a “pay-
it-forward” version of reciprocity that exists between one generation and its suc-
cessors. The second version is a more direct form of reciprocity, what we might call
a “quid-pro-quo” reciprocity. This form of reciprocity exists between the persons
transferring life-transcending projects and their future generational counterparts
who receive the projects. The idea is that members of future generational commu-
nities continue the life-transcending projects of their predecessors in return for the
transferors’ obligation to provide the project recipients with goods that are neces-
sary to continue and, where possible, improve the project. The two versions of
reciprocity, pay-it-forward and quid-pro-quo, although ping and reinforcing, are
distinct from each other because each is more closely associated with one or the
other obligation, the GO or SO. Specifically, quid-pro-quo reciprocity does the most
work with respect to those assets that are the subject of the SO, which is project-
specific. Serial reciprocity fits better with the GO, which is not asset-specific and not
peculiar (although relevant) to life-transcending projects.
As the distance between the living and the future increases, the obligations
between generational communities gradually weaken. Time generally mitigates
or dilutes the moral obligations that generations owe to the past.4 After
3 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115–17, 423, 425–27, 430–39, 444–45 (1988)
(developing a general-rights theory of property with broadly distributive implications).
4 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Complexities of Land Reparations, LAW & SOC. INQ. (forthcoming,
2014); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 14–20 (1992).
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an extended period of years, the possessor of the asset that began as a life-
transcending project is apt to regard that asset as her own, free to use it as she
wishes, and the asset loses its identity as life-transcending. No fixed period of
time can be given for such a loss of identity. The matter is highly context-
dependent, varying according to such factors as the type of asset (a modest
personal hobby or collection vs. a family farm or business), changes that may be
needed to maintain or improve the project over time, the level of personal skill
necessary to carry the project forward, etc.
The primary focus of this paper is the obligations that individuals
qua property owners owe to members of future generations. However, I also
certainly recognize that collective obligations to members of future generations
exist, especially with respect to GO. Both types of obligations, individual and
collective, may, and as I argue, do co-exist, but it is important to keep them
separate, for both their scope and respective bases may differ.
The Human-Flourishing Theory of Property:
An Overview
The fundamental normative premise of this paper is that the moral foundation of
property is human flourishing. By human flourishing, I mean that a person has
the opportunity to live a life as fulfilling as possible for him or her.5
There are two key characteristics of my conception of human flourishing.
First, it is morally pluralistic; that is, it rejects the notion that there exists a
single irreducible fundamental moral value to which all other moral values may
be reduced. Rather, it conceives of human flourishing as including (but not
limited to) – individual autonomy, personal security/privacy, personhood, self-
determination, community, and equality. These values cannot be reduced to a
single basic value because they are incommensurable; that is, there is no
available metric by which one can commensurate goods such as equality and
personhood. (It’s like saying that Einstein’s genius was “better than” Mother
Theresa’s compassion – the comparison makes no sense.) They are all aspect of
human flourishing and cannot be balanced one against the other.
The second defining characteristic of flourishing is that it is objective. This is
why flourishing is a better translation of eudaimonia than happiness is. The
5 My use of the term “human flourishing” is Aristotelian. Aristotle’s term, of course, was
eudaimonia, which is commonly translated as “happiness.” Human flourishing is a better
translation of eudaimonia, however, for reasons explained further in the paper.
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problem with “happiness” is that it connotes something that is subjectively
determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy, or
on whether my life, as a whole, has been a happy one. Contrast my being
healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might
think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was
flourishing and just be plain wrong. It is all too easy for me to be mistaken about
whether my life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia) not simply because
it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception
of eudaimonia, or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to
consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.
My account of human flourishing stresses two necessary conditions. First,
following Amartya Sen,6 I argue that human beings must develop certain
capabilities necessary for a well lived and distinctly human life. Among these
necessary capabilities are health, the ability to engage in practical reasoning,
freedom to make deliberate choices, and the ability to get along with other people
(sociability). The second necessary condition for human flourishing is a social
context. Flourishing occurs only in society with, indeed, dependent upon, other
human beings. Living within webs of social relationships is a necessary condition
for humans to develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us to flourish.
These two characteristics of human flourishing, developing necessary cap-
abilities and dependency on others, are deeply interconnected. We are not born
as autonomous agents; we learn it. And we do not develop autonomy by
ourselves or through our own devices; we develop autonomy through the help
of others. We are, in short, inevitably dependent upon various communities,
both chosen and unchosen, not only for our physical survival but also for our
ability to function as free and rational agents.
Communities, including but not limited to the state, are the mediating vehicles
through which we come to acquire the resources we need to flourish and to become
fully socialized into the exercise of our capabilities.7 Even (or more properly,
precisely) as free, rational persons, we never cease to operate within and depend
upon the matrices of the many communities in which we find ourselves in associa-
tion. Each of our identities is inextricably connected in some sense to others with
whom we are connected as members of one or typically more communities. Our
6 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1999); AMARTYASEN, FREEDOM AS DEVELOPMENT (1999).
7 The conception of community which underlays my approach to the social-obligation norm
owes much to the following works: ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART (2nd ed., 1996);
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALASTAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2nd ed.,
1998); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY(1st ed., 1989).
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identities are literally constituted by the communities of which we are members.
Asked who we are, we inevitably talk about the communities where we were born
and raised, our nation, our family, where we attended school, our friends, our
religious communities and clubs. Indeed, individuals and communities interpene-
trate one another so completely that they can never be fully separated.8
The communities in which we find ourselves play crucial roles in the
formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations, and the scope of
our aspirations. The homeless person, accustomed to receiving little more than
abuse or neglect, may come to expect little more out of life.9 Similarly, although
membership in certain communities can obviously be based upon contract or
voluntary agreement, the very possibility of these voluntarily associative rela-
tionships depends upon our prior and continuing (and typically involuntary)
participation in or exposure to communal institutions. These institutions impart
to us the information and capacities that give us the tools needed to permit us to
understand and engage in voluntary choosing at all.10
Precisely because capabilities are essential to flourishing in a distinctively
human way, development of one’s capabilities is an objective human good,
something that we ought (insofar as we accept these particular capabilities as
intrinsically valuable) to promote as a good in and of itself. As a matter of
human dignity, every person is equally entitled to flourish. This being so, every
person must be equally entitled to those things essential for human flourishing,
i.e., the capabilities that are the foundation of flourishing and the material
resources required to nurture those capabilities. In the absence of these cap-
abilities and supporting resources, recognition of the entitlement to flourish is
simply an empty gesture. But not every society will be equally conducive to
human flourishing. The cultivation of the capabilities necessary for flourishing
depends upon social matrices, and the condition of those matrices varies among
societies, sometimes quite widely. A society that fosters those capabilities that
are necessary for human flourishing is morally better than one that is either
indifferent or (even worse) hostile to their manifestation.
Human flourishing requires not only virtues but also resources. Each of us
desires resources to enable development of the capabilities that are essential for
human beings. Being social animals, moreover, humans want those resources
8 For an elaboration of this idea, see Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–28 (1989).
9 See SEN, supra note 6, at 21 (“A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can
still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment if he or she has learned to have
‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small mercies.”).
10 See TAYLOR, supra note7, at 196–98; Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, supra note 2, passim.
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not only for themselves but also for others so that they develop the capabilities
for flourishing as well.11 Hence, human flourishing requires distributive justice,
the ultimate objective of which is to give people what they need in order to
develop the capabilities necessary for living the well-lived life (though not
necessarily what they want).12
If human capacities such as health, the ability to engage in practical reasoning,
and to make reasoned decisions about how to live our lives are components of the
well-lived life, then surely we are all obligated to support and nurture the social
structures without which those human capabilities cannot be developed.13
Consequently, from the standpoint of the capabilities necessary for human flourish-
ing, how we participate in political and social communities cannot just be an
expression of our preexisting autonomy; our participation cannot be solely a voli-
tional act we commit for instrumental reasons such as preference satisfaction. Our
participation in community is also an objectively grounded obligation rooted in our
recognition of the value of the capabilities that are necessary for the well-lived life.
Acknowledgment of our human dependence upon others and upon the
social matrices that nurture the capacities that enable us to flourish creates for
us a moral obligation to support these matrices.
The Meanings of Community
The term “community” can be used to refer to a concept,14 a regulative
ideal,15 or a social institution or practice, but all too frequently scholars do not
11 See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8
(2006).
12 As Gordley points out, the Aristotelian concept of human flourishing also rests on commu-
tative justice, the object of which is to enable each person to obtain what she needs for the
development of the essential capabilities without unfairly inhibiting others’ abilities to do the
same. See id.
13 Id. at 197.
14 Referring to community as a concept, Andrew Mason has usefully distinguished between
“ordinary” community and “moralized” community. See ANDREW MASON, COMMUNITY, SOLIDARITY, AND
BELONGING: LEVELS OF BELONGING AND THEIR NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE 21–27 (2000). By “ordinary” community,
Mason means a group who act or cooperate together in pursuit of shared goals or at least who
possess common interests. Id. at 21. A “moralized” community has two additional conditions: (1)
solidarity, or mutual concern, i.e., its members must give each other’s interests some degree of non-
instrumental weight and (2) no systematic exploitation among members. Id. at 27.
15 As a regulative or normative ideal, theorists like Michael Sandel have used the term as an
alternative to the political and moral vision of “atomist” individualists, whose central doctrine
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make clear in which sense they are using the term. In the context of property
theory, community is more commonly used to refer to social institutions and
practices.16 As a social institution, community exhibits a remarkable diversity of
forms, covering a wide spectrum of practices.17 Even if we confine the term
“communities” to territorial communities, it remains maddeningly ambiguous.
Its use ranges from small face-to-face groups in which personal relationships are
close and characterized by a high degree of mutuality and identification to the
so-called global community. Part of the difficulty stems from the famous dis-
tinction drawn by Ferdinand Tönnies between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft,18
the former referring to small-scale, preindustrial groups whose social relations
are intimate, while the latter refers to the contractual and impersonal relation-
ships typical of industrial societies. Although most social scientists today regard
that distinction as unhelpful, it continues to influence some discussions of
community by a tendency to dichotomize conceptions of community as either
hopelessly weak or “tightly knit,” with the latter often romanticized as the ideal
toward which communities ought to aspire.
For present purposes, what matters is to understand that individual volition
plays only a limited role in the context of communities, as social institutions.
Membership in communities may be non-volitional as well as volitional.
Moreover, communities play crucial roles in the formation of our preferences,
the extent of our expectations, and the scope of our aspirations. Indeed, the very
possibility of communities being based on private, individual choice depends
upon our prior and continuing (and frequently involuntary) participation in or
exposure to communal institutions that impart to us the information, resources,
and capacities necessary to understand and engage in voluntary choice to
begin with.
Non-volitional communities are non-strategic in character. This means that
their members do not join them or remain in them for individual strategic
is, as Charles Taylor explains, “a principle ascribing rights to men as binding unconditionally …
[b]ut … do[es] not accept as similarly unconditional a principle of belonging or obligation.”
CHARLES TAYLOR, 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 188 (1985). Arguing
against the primacy of rights, communitarians like Taylor have propounded what he calls a
“social thesis,” which holds that the very affirmative of our right creates for us an obligation to
belong to and sustain the right kind of society, i.e., the kind of society that nurtures people’s
capabilities to develop as free and autonomous moral agents.
16 See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEO.
INQ. L. 43, 46–48 (2008).
17 See id.
18 FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 17 (Jose Harris trans., Jose Harris & Margaret
Hollis eds., Cambridge UP, 2001) (1887).
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advantages. Indeed, members of some non-volitional communities sometimes
find their membership disadvantageous in some personal, but very real sense.
For example, family members may experience membership in their families
threatening to their personal identities in some way and try to deny membership
from the family or escape from it.
The nonstrategic and noncontractual character of many communities means
that social relations within them will transcend demands for immediate or short-
term reciprocity. It further means that members of such communities, which
include but are not limited to political communities, have obligations to fellow
members of their communities. These obligations result from membership itself.
What members give to fellow community members are not in the nature of
market exchanges, where a calculated return of greater value is expected. There
may well be an expectation of reciprocity, but, as Hanoch Dagan notes,19 the
expectation may well operate over an extended period of time, perhaps even
extending over multiple lifetimes. Moreover, the form that such long-term reci-
procity takes means that compensation may be very different in kind from what
was given. Indeed, it may come from a member of the community other than the
one to whom it was given, and, in some ways, its “value” relative to the original
contribution is less important than that it is received at all.20
Are There Intergenerational Communities?
The idea that there are communities that cross-generational boundaries has
been widely contested. Without reviewing all of the objections and questions
that theorists have raised regarding this concept, we must at least consider some
of these doubts. For example, given that individuals do not regularly interact
with members of future generations, how are intergenerational communities
even possible? Second, how can such communities be said to exist when some
individuals do not identify with any generation other than their own? Third, if
communities are constitutive of individual identities insofar as its members
share notions of the good or at least participate in open debates about shared
goods, how are transgenerational constitutive communities possible where
members of future generations do not directly participate in such debates?
19 See Hanoch Dagan, Taking and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); Hanoch Dagan,
Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. 134 (2000).
20 See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, supra note 2, at
770–71.
Intergenerational Communities 29
Brought to you by | Cornell University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/6/14 5:22 PM
The first problem is familiar in the literature on intergenerational justice.
The notion of intergenerational communities seems implausible given the fact
that members of the present generation do not interact with future generations.21
In the absence of such interaction, there is no reciprocity between present and
future generations.22 There must be, one scholar argues, “the exchange of ideas
and conceptions of purposes that must be available to persons before they can
be considered to stand as joint participants in a common project.”23
This objection trades on a narrow conception of interaction. It supposes that
social interaction must be face-to-face, direct, or synchronic. But interactions
among groups often are diachronic. The transmission of cultural memories,
shared political histories and traditions,24 for example, are diachronic, yet are
forms of group interaction. In the process of such transmissions, past genera-
tions speak, as it were, to the present and future generations. Those generations,
in turn, speak back to the past by interpreting these histories and traditions from
their own point of view. What results is a hermeneutic conversation that is
certainly an “exchange of ideas and conceptions of purposes.” Indeed, this
hermeneutic intergenerational conversation is sometimes more robust than
that among generational contemporaries.
Related to the question of interaction is another objection that is sometimes
raised. Because present and future people are not positioned so as to be able to
reciprocate with each other, they cannot develop a sense of identity with each
other, a feeling of being on the same side.25 This objection fails to take account
of the multiple ways in which people can and do identify with each other. It is
not fruitful to ask whether members of one group identify in the abstract with
members of another group. The more helpful question is whether there is some
specific level or respect in which members of the different groups identify with
each other. For example, as a practicing Roman Catholic, I identify with
Catholics around the world on the various issues that concern the Church
despite the fact that I am not in a position to reciprocate with many of them.
Identification for purposes of community existence does not require complete or
100% identity of interests or views. Such a requirement would disqualify many
groups that otherwise plainly are communities, including families. What is
21 See, e.g., Ernest Partridge, Future Generations, in A COMPANION TO ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 377
(Dale Jamieson ed., 2001).
22 See Norman S. Care, Future Generations, Public Policy and the Motivation Problem, 4 (3)
ENVIRON. ETHICS 195 (1982).
23 NORMAN S. CARE, DECENT PEOPLE 112 (2000).
24 In the U.S., for example, a clear example is the history and tradition of the U.S. Constitution,
a cultural memory that has been the subject of extraordinarily lively debates.
25 See Care, supra note 22, at 208–09.
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required is that members of the two groups experience a sense of common
membership with respect to some value that is important to them both.
A third objection concerns shared purposes. Presumably, members of com-
munities hold shared purposes or norms. Such sharing is indispensable to the
existence of communities because of their constitutive nature. According to this
constitutive conception of communities,26 a “community [is] … constitutive of
the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institu-
tional arrangements…”27 That is, what binds members of the community
together is not sentiment but identity.28 Community members share understand-
ings of whom and what they are, and these understandings are sufficiently
fundamental that they constitute part of the members’ self-identities.
Avner de-Shalit refers to the experience of sharing that is necessary for
constitutive communities by the term “moral similarity.”29 He distinguishes
that term from cultural homogeneity that may characterize groups that may
lack shared ideas or purposes.30 Nor does moral similarity require unanimity.
Communities experience debate about the ideas and norms they share, some-
times quite robustly. Old ideas may be reexamined; new one proposed and
either adopted or rejected. As the community’s normative constitution shifts,
some members may become disaffected, losing their moral similarity, and drop
out. The shift may attract new member in turn. The point is that debate is very
much a part of, indeed even necessary for, the experience of moral similarity.
If debate is necessary for the moral similarity that characterizes commu-
nities, how is such a debate possible between members of present and future
generations? Here de-Shalit introduces another concept that is useful – cultural
interaction. De-Shalit points out that every community has its own history of
cultural interaction, which includes political, social, and cultural experiences
that they share as well as shared traditions, symbols, practices, and codes.31
Cultural interaction is not confined within the same generation, of course, for
children interact in various ways with their parents and grandparents about the
meanings and even legitimacy of their traditions and beliefs. These interactions
are face-to-face, but others are not. For example, religious communities whose
shared traditions include historical texts read, interpret, reinterpret, and debate
those texts over many generations, sometimes centuries, in an ongoing debate
26 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); AVNER DE-SHALIT, WHY POSTERITY
MATTERS: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (1995).
27 SANDEL, supra note 26, at 173.
28 See DE-SHALIT, supra note 26, at 33.
29 Id. at 25–31 and passim.
30 Id. at 27.
31 Id. at 23.
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about the meaning and legitimacy of various textual meanings. These debates
are between present and past generations as well as within single generations.
This example is what Alasdair C. MacIntyre has in mind when he writes “[L]iving
tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an
argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.
Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes
through many generations.”32
The contested meaning and even legitimacy of the religious group’s core
texts are the topics of an ongoing argument as to the religion’s very identity. In
this respect, as MacIntyre points out, “Traditions … embody continuities of
conflict.”33
These continuities are forward looking as well as backward looking. Cultural
practices commonly speak to the future, even the distant future. When origina-
tors of core religious texts (or glosses upon those texts) write, they address not
only their contemporaries but also followers (including future converts) who will
listen to their texts and reply, as it were, throughout the generations ahead. The
conversation is not face-to-face, but it is very real nonetheless. It is as real as
when an American citizen writes a letter to her President, knowing that there
will be no reply. The letter writer does not think she is speaking to herself, for
there is some possibility that her letter will influence the President in some well,
however indirectly or slightly.
Future community members to whom the group’s cultural values, traditions,
and practices are addressed receive the message. Their cultural and normative
starting point is what they inherited from their forebears. But they are not merely
passive receptors. They answer back by reviewing, critiquing, and sometimes
revising the cultural traditions and normative material that they inherited.
Revision is sometimes necessary because of changes in the community’s circum-
stances, economic, social, technological, or other types of changes.34 Eventually,
the degree of moral similarity will diminish to the point that it is no longer
meaningful to consider the intergenerational community as still existing. De-
Shalit explains:
When it comes about that the values of the members of the community change drastically,
many members will find themselves in a state of growing alienation from the community of
their ancestors. This will continue until the question arises as to whether they still regard it
as the same transgenerational community, a community which defines the “self[”] of its
32 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 222 (1981).
33 Id.
34 See DE-SHALIT, supra note 26, at 46–49.
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members. A time will come when it becomes questionable whether future generations will
still speak of the same transgenerational community.35
Intergenerational constitutive communities, then, are both dynamic and contin-
gent. They change, and their duration is limited, dependent as they are upon
external factors that affect their members’ identification with them and their
shared normative orientation.
Can Obligations Exist within Intergenerational
Communities?
The human flourishing theory grounds obligation on dependence. As we have
seem, it locates the source of property owners’ obligations to their communities
on the fact that all human beings are dependent throughout their lives on others
to provide them in various ways with the means necessary to enable the devel-
opment of certain indispensable capabilities. Even if one agrees, following the
previous analysis, that communities are not confined to presently living persons,
one may argue that, on the theory’s own premises, property owners cannot owe
obligations to members of future generations because the living are not depen-
dent upon unborn persons. This is a powerful objection, and it requires careful
consideration.
Looking Back: Obligations to Past Generations – Dependence
and Life-Transcending Projects
Before looking forward, we must first look back. That is, we need first to discuss
obligations that the present generation owes to past generations and the basis
for such obligations. Much has already been written on this topic,36 but what
matters for my purposes is the role of dependence in establishing obligations
between members of different generations. The basis for skepticism that such an
obligation exists is the very fact that members of past generations are dead.
Because they are gone, the skeptic argues, nothing that we do or do not do today
can possibly make their lives go any better or worse. The response to this
35 Id. at 47.
36 See, e.g., THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998); George Pitcher, The Misfortunes
of the Dead, 21 AM. PHIL. Q 183 (1984).
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objection that I shall make will pave the way for the case for obligations that we
owe to future generations.
Life-Transcending Projects
The skeptic’s argument that living persons can do nothing to affect the lives of
those who are dead ultimately rests on the assumption that obligations must be
based on avoidance of harm.37 Whether the dead can be harmed is a matter of
considerable debate in the philosophical literature,38 but we need not resolve
that debate to conclude that the present generation does owe obligations to the
past. There is another basis for such obligations, an alternative to the harm
principle. That basis is what we can call life-transcending projects. People have
interests in having life-transcending projects carried through and realized after
they deaths, sometimes many years after their deaths, but obviously they cannot
do so themselves. They are dependent upon the living to honor the interest that
the dead have in seeing their life-transcending projects continued and realized
beyond the death of their creators.
Life-transcending projects are those projects the personal value or impor-
tance of which transcend creators or originators of the projects personally and so
transcend their lifetimes. Such projects vary widely. They range from money-
making personal projects, such as businesses that people have created, to
public-minded projects, such as charitable foundations. Nor are life-transcend-
ing projects limited to material affairs of these sorts. They may be as abstract as
ideas or theories that a person has developed and to which she has devoted a
great deal of effort and time. There are many obvious examples of life-trans-
cending projects, including important private institutions including universities
(e.g., Stanford, Cornell, The University of Chicago), museums (e.g., the Barnes
Museum, the Guggenheim Museum); foundations (e.g., the Ford Foundation, the
Carnegie Foundation); private hospitals, and so on.
Wealthy individuals commonly create charitable trusts in their wills, and
these charitable trusts typically involve life-transcending projects. Charitable
trust donors usually impose restrictions on what the trustees can do with the
trust funds, and these restrictions represent attempts to assure that future
37 See JANNA THOMPSON, INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN INTERGENERATIONAL
POLITY 56 (2009).
38 See, e.g., Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341 (1987); Pitcher, supra note 36;
Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISIS 4 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974).
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trustees fulfill the donor’s life-transcending project. Sometimes these restrictions
become impossible or impracticable to implement, and the law must modify the
terms of the trust instrument so that the trust can operate on terms as close as
possible to the donor’s original intent.39 At other times, however, the donor’s
restrictions are so extreme or become irreconcilable with evolving public policy
that courts are no longer willing to carry out the donor’s project as originally
intended. (A racially discriminatory trust is an example.40) When that occurs,
the court must decide whether the donor’s project was so intimately tied to the
offensive feature that he would not want to go forward without it. If that is the
case, then the court must refuse to carry out the trust. But if the court concludes
that in its judgment the offensive feature was not indispensable to the donor’s
project, then the court will revise the terms of the project to remove the offend-
ing feature and go forward with it.
Wealthy persons are not the only ones who have life-transcending projects,
the fulfillment of which require the help of future generations. Owners of small
businesses and family farms usually hope that the enterprises to which they
have devoted the better portion of their lives will continue to thrive after their
deaths, and they depend on future generations to carry out their hopes and
dreams. Inventors hope that their creations will continue to be used many years
after their deaths. Authors hope that their works will continue to attract readers
for decades, even centuries to come. Scholars hope that future scholars will use
their work, and so on.
Other examples are less obvious. For example, personal activities such as
artwork (painting, sculpture, etc.), crafts (pottery, knitting, needlework, etc.),
and even gardening develop into life-transcending projects for many people. So,
too, do collections ranging from coins and stamps to artwork. Collectors com-
monly are passionate about their collections, and they pass them on to others at
their death in the hope that future owners will recognize the project’s signifi-
cance and survive rather than simply being tossed away as if it were nothing
more than yesterday’s newspapers. Such activities and collections are not life-
transcending for everyone, of course. Some are just hobbies or amusements that
people use to pass the time. But for many people, wealthy and poor alike,
activities and collections, often quite modest, are indeed life-transcending.
They enable their creators in important ways to flourish. The results of these
39 This is known as the cy pres doctrine (cy pres is short for cy prescomme possible, a phrase
taken from old Law French, meaning “as nearly as possible”). It is well-established in the
common law. See, e.g., UNIFORM TRUST CODE §413 (2010);RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §67 (2003–12).
40 See, e.g., Home for Incurables of Baltimore City v. University of Maryland Medical System
Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002) (trust for “white patients who need physical rehabilitation”).
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activities often are weighted with self-expression and personal identity. It would
be surprising if even the most modestly talented amateur artist or woodworker is
indifferent to destiny of her or his creation. Creators care about the future of
their creations. Creators of all sorts do not value their creations solely for the
enjoyment that they give the creators during their lifetimes. Creations have
deeper value than that. In a very real sense, such creations, even those limited
in achievement or talent, represent a form of immortality for their creators. What
such projects transcend, then, is not self-interest but time.
Even those whose lives have seemingly not been devoted to creative enter-
prises have their own life-transcending projects. The protection and care of
family heirlooms, even though with modest or slight market value, is often a
matter of great concern to ordinary people, including people of limited wealth.
They pass on to their children and grandchildren objects that they themselves
received from their ancestors as tokens of memory, family continuity, and love,
and they depend on their children and grandchildren to care for these emotion-
ally weighted objects and to pass them on when their turn comes.
Life-Transcending Projects and Dependence
The creators of life-transcending projects cannot realize time-transcendent value
of their projects by themselves; they are dependent on others – future genera-
tions – to do so. The immorality that the creators of such projects seek for their
creations requires the cooperation of future generations. The dependency of past
generational members upon their living counterparts may take multiple forms,
ranging from recognition of the project as something worth pursuing to execu-
tion and ongoing management of the project.
Project creators sometimes attempt to reduce the discretion of their succes-
sors to recognize and implement life-transcending projects through the same
techniques discussed previously, notable legal arrangements that impose duties
on the donees to comply with specified restrictions. Arrangements like trusts are
especially common among wealthier creators, whose life-transcending projects
often are an important part of their estate portfolio. Such arrangements often
pose serious problems, both legal and moral, that we need to consider.
The Dead Hand Problem
Restrictions that now-deceased creators of life-transcending projects some-
times impose on later generation beneficiaries of these projects may pose
36 G. S. Alexander
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difficult questions concerning the obligations of the living generation when
asked to implement the terms of the project. For example, when creators of
life-transcending projects transfer their projects to later generation benefici-
aries in trusts, they sometimes do so through family trusts that extend the
duration of trust for very long periods of time, over many generations of
future beneficiaries who are given only limited property interests in the
projects. The creator’s objective is to control the project for many generations
after his death. This creates a problem known to common-law lawyers as the
“dead hand” problem.41 Anglo-American law places limits on these dead
hand trusts, albeit indirectly, through various rules, including the infamous
Rule Against Perpetuities.42 Other problematic creator-imposed restrictions in
trusts include prohibitions on the sale of an asset that the creator originally
transferred into the trust and which later declines in value, thereby threaten-
ing the interests of the beneficiaries. Commonly, the assets in question are
life-transcending projects, such as a business that the creator personally
started and developed.
A good example of this problem is the case of Joseph Pulitzer’s will.43
Pulitzer, after whom the top American annual prizes for journalism is
named,44 left a will that gave to his trustees the large majority of shares of
stock in a publishing company that he owned and created, the Press
Publishing Company. This firm published several newspapers, including the
now-defunct New York World, to which Pulitzer was particularly devoted. The
trust was for the benefit of his sons. Pulitzer’s will expressly withheld
from the trustees the power to sell the Press Publishing Company stock
“under any circumstances whatever….”45 The will went on to give Pulitzer’s
reasons, reflecting the fact that the Press Publishing Company was his life-
transcending project:
I particularly enjoin upon my sons and my descendants the duty of preserving, perfecting
and perpetuating “The World” newspaper (to the maintenance and upbuilding of which I
have sacrificed my health and strength) in the same spirit which in which I have striven to
create and conduct it as a public institution, from motives higher than mere gain, it having
41 See LEWIS SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND passim (1955).
42 The common law version of the rule, first set out in the famous case of Duke of Norfolk’s
Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681), provides that “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §201 (4th ed., 1942).
43 Matter of Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff’dmem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932).
44 See Columbia Journalism School, The Pulitzer Prizes, available at http://www.journalism.
columbia.edu/page/164-pulitzer (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
45 Supra note 43, at 92.
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been my desire that it should be at all times conducted in a spirit of independence and
with a view to inculcating high standards and public spirit among the people and their
official representatives, and it is my earnest wish that said newspaper shall hereafter be
conducted upon the same principles.46
Some years after Pulitzer’s death, readership of the World newspaper steadily
eroded, causing the value of the Press Publishing Company stock to substantially
decline. The trustees sought judicial approval to sell the stock on the ground that
the unanticipated changes of circumstances threatened to defeat the purpose of
the trust, which, they argued, was the benefit of Pulitzer’s sons. The court agreed,
holding that it had the inherent power to respond to emergency circumstances
that threatened total destruction of the trust asset. Regarding the will’s language
that the stock not be sold under any circumstances, the court stated, “A man of
his [Pulitzer’s] sagacity and business ability could not have intended that from
mere vanity, the publication of the newspapers, with which his name and efforts
had been associated, should be persisted in until the entire trust asset was
destroyed or wrecked by bankruptcy or dissolution.”47
John Langbein has posed the challenging question, “Suppose … that the
settlor in Pulitzer had foreseen and recited in the trust instrument the danger
that the newspaper might become unprofitable, and he directed the trustees to
continue operating it anyhow.” Langbein points out, “Such a restriction would
not have been enforceable.”48 He goes on the explain, “Attempting to prevent
the court from modifying the trust in response to such materially worsened
circumstances would offend the anti-dead hand principle embodied in the rule
that the trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”49 The “benefit-the-
beneficiaries” rule to which Langbein refers expresses the public policy that
once a person has placed property in trust for the benefit of third parties, their
benefit must override any personal motive that the creator may have had
regarding the continuing use of the property that is fundamentally incompatible
with the beneficiaries’ interests.50
The New York World newspaper was a life-transcending project of Joseph
Pulitzer, as his restriction so vividly manifests. The case is a good illustration of
both the fact that there must be limits on the obligations, especially legal
obligations, that the living owe to the dead to implement life-transcending
46 Id.
47 Id. at 95.
48 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rule in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
49 Id. at 1118–19 (footnote omitted).
50 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §404, 105(b)(3); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §27(2) (2003–12).
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projects of the dead, however fundamental they may have been, and some of the
reasons why such limits must exist.
The dead hand problem creates a risk of undermining the communal character
of intergenerational relations. Past generations may not only impose restrictions of
the sort I have just described, but they may refuse to transfer important assets to
future generations of family members altogether. For example, Joseph Pulitzer may
have chosen to leave his newspaper businesses to a business associate rather than
to his sons. This undermines the dependency between generations and inhibits
future generations from working within the framework necessary for communal
relations between the generations. The role of future generations is, after all, to
participate in the life-transcending projects of past generations, enhance them, and
enable them to be carried forward into the future. If members of past generations
exercise their control over those projects by refusing to transmit them within the
family, broadly defined, then this role will be frustrated.
There is no obvious or easy way to avoid this risk. It is a consequence of a
legal system that prefers the freedom of past owners over that the interests of the
living. American law imposes no restrictions upon the ability of testators to leave
their property at death to whomever they wish, disinheriting any members of
their family except the surviving spouse.51 We must work within whatever limits
the existing legal system creates. Nevertheless, reasons of self-interest suggest
that this risk is not great. Creators of life-transcending projects usually trust their
children and grandchildren more than non-family members to carry through
with their projects. After all, in most cases the creator’s children have been with
the project since its inception and are more aware than most people of its
important to their parent. The parent may even have groomed the children or
grandchildren to take over care and management of the project at the appro-
priate time in the future. This is by no means an invariable scenario. Parents
sometimes do disinherit their children, but the incidence of this is sufficiently
small that the risk of this aspect of the dead hand problem is not great.
Are Intended Transferees Obligated to Accept
Life-Transcending Projects?
Do the transferees of life-transcending projects owe obligations to past-genera-
tion creators to accept the projects and carry through with them, or are they free
51 American states have statutes, called elective share statutes that protect a surviving spouse
from disinheritance. The statutes vary in their details, but typically give the surviving spouse a
non-barrable share of 1/3 of the decedent’s estate. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 349–53 (5th ed., 2011).
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to refuse to accept the projects? Normally, of course, the law of gifts provides
that intended donees are free to refuse gifts – acceptance is a requirement for
completion of a donative transfer.52 But is there a moral obligation here? There
may, after all, be different considerations when asking whether a legal or moral
obligation exists to the past generation.
There really are two separate questions here: first, whether the intended
transferee is free to refuse the transfer entirely or instead must accept the life-
transcending project; second, whether, if the transferee accepts the project, she
is free to possess, use, or enjoy that project in whatever way she sees fit,
regardless of the creator’s original purpose or intent. With respect to the first
question, autonomy considerations loom here, but they do so as to both sides.
Inevitably, someone’s autonomy interest must be sacrificed – that is precisely
the rub of the dead hand dilemma.
I have suggested earlier that human dependence upon members of commu-
nities to which we belong, communities that enable us to flourish, creates for us
a moral obligation to support, in ways that are appropriate to us, their flourish-
ing. Does this general principle mean that intended recipients of life-transcend-
ing projects are morally obligated to accept transfers of those projects? I think it
does, although the obligation that it creates must be one that is defeasible, for
reasons that I shall explain. In transmitting life-transcending projects to their
future counterparts, members of each generational community become depen-
dent upon those successors to accept and carry forward the project in order to
fulfill the project’s life-transcending purpose. The fulfillment of that purpose is
constitutive of the creator’s life as one that is as well-lived as possible. Creators
transmit their projects to their future counterparts with the expectation that the
designated recipients will accept the projects and exercise reasonable efforts to
carry the projects forward in the best possible way. If creators knew that their
projects would die with them, their lives would be significantly diminished.
At the same time, this obligation is defeasible, rather than absolute. Persons
to whom life-transcending projects have been forwarded for caretaking and
fulfillment must be free to reject the projects that are themselves immoral or
that otherwise unreasonably burden them.53 The reason is the recipient’s indi-
vidual autonomy. Although autonomy is not a paramount value in the human
flourishing theory, it is nevertheless relevant to that theory.
52 See RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 484, 493 (2009).
53 Concomitantly, creators of life-transcending projects, in transmitting such projects to suc-
cessive generational members, are under the moral obligation not to impose immoral, unrea-
sonable, or foolish projects on their successors.
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This leads to the second question, whether the recipient of a life-transcend-
ing project should be free to possess, use, or enjoy that project in whatever way
she sees fit, regardless of the creator’s original purpose or intent. I said earlier
that intended recipients are under a moral defeasible duty to accept such
projects and to make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward and
promote them in their intended way. Just what does this duty of “reasonable
efforts” entail? The question eludes any precise answer. Certainly, transferees
are not entirely free to possess, use, or enjoy projects they possess in any way
they seem fit. Nor is the duty absolute in the opposite sense: It makes no moral
sense to say that, having accepted the project, the transferee is strictly and
unconditionally bound to whatever terms the creator may have imposed. The
matter is inevitably context-dependent, as the very term “reasonable” suggests.
Among the variables that we should consider are, how of a burden the project
imposes upon the possessor. The greater the burden and the more the project
disrupts the recipient’s life, the greater amount of freedom she should have.
Displaying a painting created by the transferor is a far simpler matter than
continuing, with the possible need for substantial future improvements, a family
farm. Conversely, we should consider how much of a benefit the possessor is
obtaining from the project. A possessor should be required to make greater
efforts to promote a project from which she obtains substantial benefits.54
Another factor that will carry weight in the reasonableness calculus is time.
The further removed in time the recipient is from the creator, the weaker the
obligation becomes. This is not only because it becomes more difficult to
determine exactly what the creator’s wishes were but also because circum-
stances are likely to change as more time passes, creating the need to weaken
the recipient’s obligations to the dead. American trust law, even while requiring
that the original donor’s intent be respected, recognizes the need to build
flexibility into the trust arrangement to accommodate future changes in circum-
stances. For charitable trusts, the cy-pres (“as near as possible”) doctrine permits
courts to revise the terms of trusts where changed circumstances have made it
impossible or impracticable to fulfill the donor’s original plans.55 For private
trusts, the deviation doctrine permits courts to modify the terms of a trust where
54 For example, suppose a project is a rental building that is aging and beginning to require
greater maintenance if its life is to be extended. If the building’s net income-stream would
continue to be high enough to provide the current owner a comfortable level of support even
after paying expenses necessary for the building’s upkeep, the owner should be required to
make improvements necessary to extend the building’s lifetime, rather than “milking” the
building to derive a higher rental level.
55 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §413 (2010).
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unanticipated changes of circumstances put the trust’s well-being in jeopardy.56
Similar considerations apply with respect to moral obligations owed to past
generations.
Looking Forward: Obligations to Future Generations
and Forms of Reciprocity
Let us now reverse direction and look forward. Having concluded that mem-
bers of the living generation owe duties, moral and at times legal, to honor
and carry out certain life-transcending projects of the dead, does it necessarily
follow that the same holds true of the relationship between those who are now
living and the unborn? After all, the relationship between present and future
generations can be seen as just the mirror image of that between the present
and the past: living people are the future dead, and unborns are the future
living.
Earlier, I have suggested that the basis of obligations that community
members owe to each other, inter- as well as intra-generationally, is depen-
dence. I suggested further that dependence can be understood in terms of
reciprocity between inter-generational community members. Finally, I have
distinguished between two different sorts of reciprocity, “quid-pro-quo” reci-
procity and “pay-it-forward” reciprocity and suggested that although the two
forms of reciprocity overlap with and indeed reinforce each other, each has
greater valence with respect to past or future generational communities, as the
case may be. Quid-pro-quo, a more direct form of reciprocity, has greater
salience in the context of the relationship between present and past genera-
tional communities. As I discuss in greater detail in the next section, quid-pro-
quoreciprocity is more particularly relevant to specific obligation (SO), which
generally involves specific assets (“in return for honoring my deceased
father’s desire that I take care of the family farm he passed on the me, he
endowed me with the capital and other material means necessary to make it
succeed.”)
A dependency relationship also exists between present and future genera-
tions, and this dependency relationship, too, creates reciprocity. But the nature
of the reciprocity is more serial than direct, more “pay-it-forward” than “give-
back-for-what-you-get.” Serial reciprocity has a kind of asymmetrical character.
We pay on to the next generations what we have received from the past – clean
environment, basic infrastructure, a workable public system of government,
56 See UNIFORM TRUST CODE §412 (2010).
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i.e., the goods that are the substance of the general obligation (GO). Future
generations generally depend on their ancestors to leave them with such goods
as their starting point.
Of course, it is possible for future generations to create these conditions
themselves in the absence of such an endowment, but that seems neither
realistic nor morally sound. Successive generations have forwarded material
endowments to their forebears for millennia, and there are good moral reasons
why they should. Just as the past has endowed us with the material background
goods required for us to have the kind of lives that enable us to carry on their
life-transcending projects, so we should endow the future for the same reason.
Future generations are dependent upon us to provide such endowments to that
end. That is the point of serial reciprocity.57
Serial reciprocity imposes upon on an obligation not to consume the
capital endowment that we have received from past generations, the capital
endowment that enabled us. We are morally obligated to conserve it, maintain
it, and improve it, where necessary. We cannot simply “milk” such capital
endowments for our own benefit, consuming them with no investment for the
future. “Milking” is a practice that effectively dissipates and ends the
endowment.58
Consider our transportation infrastructure, which as I discuss in the next
section, is part of the substantive content of the GO. We inherited from the
generations that preceded us a transportation system that once rivaled the rest
of the world. Airlines ran on time; train service was extensive, relatively cheap,
and convenient; highways, local and interstate, were well-maintained; bridges
57 This view of serial reciprocity places considerable distance between my approach and that of
John Rawls. According to Rawls (A THEORY OF JUSTICE 287 ff. (1999)), the obligation between
generations is best solved on the basis of a “just savings principle.” That principle requires each
generation, acting under the veil of ignorance, to adopt a rate of capital accumulation that is
appropriate to each stage of advance. Rawls says that eventually, once just institutions have
been established, the required accumulation rate will be zero, and all that the society need do is
to maintain just institutions and preserve their material base. RAWLS, supra, at 287. Rawls
contends that every generation gains a reasonable rate of accumulation is maintained. “The
process of accumulation, once it is begun and carried through, is to the good of all subsequent
generations,” he argues. “Each passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real capital as defined
by a just savings principle.” Id. at 288. This form of reciprocity is “peculiar,” Rawls recognizes,
because rather than paying back to the generation from which it received accumulated capital,
each generation pays its accumulated capital on to the succeeding generation – hence, the term
“serial reciprocity.” Id. at 290. Unlike my theory Rawls’ view of serial reciprocity between takes
no account of the role of dependency.
58 Cf. supra note 54.
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were safe and in good repair; and so on. As anyone who has flown or who drives
knows, the picture has changed. Airline service unreliability is a topic of late-
night comedians; train service has dried up in many parts of the country
(including my home town of Ithaca, New York); highways are pitted with end-
lessly unfilled potholes; bridges are rusting to unsafe conditions in familiar
important crossings. Some politicians periodically urge public investment in at
least some aspects of this infrastructure, but little action is taken in an environ-
ment of declining public investment in collective goods. The transportation
infrastructure has become an inherited capital endowment that the current
generation is milking. The current generation is seriously at risk of breaching
its moral obligation, based on serial reciprocity, to pass on to future generations
the same necessary capital endowment that it received from its forebears.
This example also suggests why it is a mistake to appeal to market-based
discount rates in analyzing the present generation’s moral obligations to future
generations.59 Discount rates value the costs and benefit accruing to future
generations less than those of the current generation.60 It is “a numerical way
of expressing the value judgment that beyond a certain point the future is not
worth anything to presently living people.”61 There seems little room for doubt
that individuals do engage in discounting in making decisions in their own lives,
and their rates of discounting are, it appears, high.62 But it is a very different
question whether discounting is appropriate, or even relevant, as to the question
of whether the current generation owes obligations to the future.63 As John
O’Neill observes, “It is not that discount rates should be zeros, negative or
positive, but that they are on the whole irrelevant to the discussion of the policy
one should adopt to the future.”64 He goes on to note, “There are good princi-
ples that govern our dealings with the future – that we minimize resource
depletion, that we avoid irreversible changes that we engage in sustainable
economic activity and so on.”65
59 The literature on this topic is vast. A few sources that I have found especially helpful include
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 480–86 (Oxford, 1984); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting … on
Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land’s Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821,
853–856 (2009).
60 See JOHN O’NEILL, ECOLOGY, POLICY AND POLITICS 48–49 (1993).
61 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 35–36 (1996).
62 See Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J.
ECON. LIT. 351, 393–94 (2002).
63 See O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 49–59.
64 Id. at 59 (emphasis in original). Rawls also rejects discounting from the moral point of view.
See RAWLS, supra note 57, at 253.
65 O’NEILL, supra note 60, at 57..
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The Substantive Content of Obligations to Future
and Past Generational Communities
Assuming, at least provisionally, that intergenerational communities exist (i.e.,
that such a concept is meaningful) and that members of such communities owe
each other duties, just what are those duties, and, equally important, what are
the limits of those duties? These duties are moral duties, although conceivably
they might have legal implications. My main concern here is with the moral
duties, although I have some comments regarding possible legal aspects.
More important for my purposes than the distinction between moral and
legal duties is the distinction between, on the one hand, the GO, the obligation
to pass on to successor generational community members the basic material
conditions that any decent liberal society owes to its own members, i.e., an
infra-generational obligation concerning goods that such a society ought to save
rather than consume, and on the other hand, the SO, the obligation that creators
of life-transcending projects owe to their recipients of such projects to provide
such particular goods are necessary to carry the project forward in its intended
way. As I have already indicated, the GO and SO, although overlapping and
reinforcing, are distinct from each other and involve different forms of recipro-
city that involve different sets of goods. After describing the substance of two
types of obligations, I then discuss the extent to which each is collective rather
than individual.
Paying It Forward: The GO and Necessary Background
Conditions
What members of future generational communities minimally require in order to
further the life-transcending projects transferred to them are certain essential
material conditions. We cannot reasonably expect our future generational mem-
bers to continue the projects that we have begun unless they live in circum-
stances within which they can live decent lives. No one can flourish without
certain basic resources that provide a background for existence. They are the
goods that any decent society owes to members of its own generation, i.e., they
are infra-generational, and there is nothing uniquely inter-generational about
them. At the same time, they constitute the substance of inter-generational
obligations – the obligation owed to future generations – insofar as future
generations must be enabled to flourishing generally in order to fulfill projects,
their own as well as those transmitted to them by their predecessor. These goods
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are constitutive of the requisite material background for flourishing. From
this perspective, they are the substance of the living generation’s general obliga-
tion (GO) to the future, discussed in the preceding section, to pass on to
future generations the material endowments that past generations have for-
warded to us.
Which resources properly belong on such a list of basic goods that provide
the background conditions that are necessary for human flourishing is the
subject of endless debate. Certain goods seem unarguably on such a list, how-
ever. These include a well-functioning public security system and an adequate
defense regime. Both a well-functioning police force and national security
system are indispensable for personal security, without which no one can live
a well-lived life. The background infrastructure would also include a clean (or
reasonably so) environment – air, water, and so on – that future generational
communities will inhabit and in which they will work. Lacking such an envir-
onment, they simply will be unable to carry through with any life-transcending
projects, including their own. As Joel Feinberg remarked, “[S]urely we owe it to
future generations to pass on a world that is not a used up garbage heap.”66 The
background conditions must also include a reasonably well-functioning govern-
ment (including legal) system, one that is free (or relatively so) of corruption and
is responsive to the greater community’s needs. The requisite background infra-
structure will also include well-functioning transportation and communication
networks. It will further include a health-care system that provides decent and
affordable health care.
This is a list of what we minimally owe, as a moral matter, to unborn
members of the various communities. The resources on this list are those
goods that nurture the capabilities necessary for their flourishing. The list, as I
have already indicated is not exclusive. I have kept it minimal in order to attract
a broad range of agreement regarding what must be provided. Far less agree-
ment will be reached on the questions who bears the obligations to provide
these goods and what the bases of those obligations are.
Bases of Collective Obligations
I consider three possible bases for obligations owed to future generational
communities, collective action problems; contract, including implied under-
standings; and dependency. Although it is possible that in particular cases
66 Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISIS, supra note 38, at 64–65.
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they will overlap, it is important to treat them separately, for they the scope and
content of moral obligations that each may justify is likely to differ.
Collective Active Problems and Other Economic Rationales
From a strictly cost-minimizing perspective, the obligation to provide some, but
not all of the goods on the list of resources necessary for adequate background
conditions is public. Other goods should be privately provided. Several of these
resources are classic public goods, insofar as they meet the two usual character-
istics of such goods, i.e., non-rivalry and non-excludability. These resources
include a clean environment, and a well-functioning public security (police),
and an adequate defense regime. Due to well-known collective action problems,
we cannot rely on individual preferences or market forces effectively to provide
such resources. The obligation to do so, both now, and into the future, must be
collective, carried out by the state, through taxation and regulatory programs.
Other resources that comprise a necessary background for flourishing are
not classic public goods but are goods whose characteristics are such that their
social provision is nevertheless most efficiently provided through public rather
than private means, both now and for future generations. These resources
include at least some aspects of the health-care system that generate substantial
externalities (e.g., vaccination and care for communicable diseases; arguably,
prenatal care67 – in both cases, there are substantial externalities that make
these goods public goods like). However, there is much of health care that may
not implicate externality concerns of this nature.68 If we move beyond public
goods analysis, we can note the many private market failures that may plague
the health-care marketplace, justifying public involvement quite apart from
public goods considerations. Basically, private provision of health insurance
has proven itself to be plagued by high administrative costs which derive from
many forces. Public provision is simply cheaper. Employment-based plans
heavily subsidized by the tax code has been one good middle ground.69
67 Thanks to George Hay for these examples.
68 If we start with the presumption that our society as a baseline will guarantee some forms of
care – e.g., emergency care (legislatively mandated in the U.S.) – and acknowledge that some
individuals cannot pay for such care, then we can see that the U.S. system and its many forms
of cross subsidization imposes externalities of other sorts. I am grateful to Mike Frakes for
pointing this out to me.
69 See Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 571 (2008).
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Contract-Based Obligations
A second possible basis for the obligation to future generation members is
contract. Where an agreement, explicit or implicit, existed between the trans-
feror of the life-transcending project and the recipients, the presumption should
be that the agreement, assuming that it can be satisfactorily proved, creates an
obligation, both moral and legal, in the recipients. This is simply a matter of
basic contract principles. The real question is whether there ought to be any
limits on the scope of that moral obligation. Plainly, there are some limits, both
as a matter of law and morality, to freedom of contract. Terms, conditions, or
restrictions that creator–donors place on transfers that violate public policy do
not and should not create obligations, moral or legal, on beneficiaries of such
transfers. Transfers subject to racially restrictive conditions, to pick an obvious
example, impose no enforceable obligations on beneficiaries even where the
beneficiaries had previously agreed to such terms. The autonomy interests of the
donor and the beneficiaries should not trump the larger stakes that society has
in assuring that no group of its citizen is subordinated, dominated, or rendered
unable to fully participate in the society’s ongoing affairs, private as well as
public.
Beyond terms or conditions of that sort, the question becomes more difficult
to evaluate. Suppose, for example, that a testator bequeaths her business to her
children with the understanding that the children continue to operate the busi-
ness in exactly the same way that the testator had; i.e., for precisely the same
business functions, with no expansion or other change in scope of business, no
diversification of type of business, place of doing business, etc. Suppose further
that some years later, the business’s future is in jeopardy because the market for
the firm’s product had all but disappeared. The firm’s current owners, the
beneficiaries of the bequest of the firm’s creator, want to save the business by
diversifying its product line, but doing would clearly contradict the terms of the
bequest. Would diversifying the firm’s product line to save the family business
breach an obligation, legal or moral, that the current owners owe to the past
owner (all of whom are members of the same generational community)? From a
legal perspective, it is unclear whether such an obligation exists. Normally, the
law of donative transfers gives maximum effect to the transferor’s wishes, but
this only the baseline. There is an exception for public policy, of course, just as
there is a public policy exception for the enforceability of agreements. For
example, restraints that testator’s impose on a beneficiary’s personal conduct
may be unenforceable on public policy grounds. Here, the restriction is on
business conduct rather than personal conduct. Different policy considerations
are involved where the restriction is on business conduct rather than on personal
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affairs such as the beneficiary’s right to marry, especially here where an agree-
ment between the transferor and the beneficiaries apparently exists. No personal
rights of the beneficiaries are at stake, only the well-being of the business firm.
Given the law’s reluctance to interfere with freedom of disposition, it is quite
possible, indeed likely, that the answer to the legal question is that a legal
obligation on the beneficiaries to comply with the transferor’s conditions exists,
even at the risk of the firm dissolving into bankruptcy in the future.
As a moral matter, there is little reason to reach a different conclusion.
Although somewhat different considerations come to bear when we move from
the legal to the moral sphere, the matter does not change fundamentally. The
principles of freedom of disposition and freedom of contract have a moral
dimension as well, and there are no overriding moral considerations that
weigh in favor of relieving the beneficiaries of an obligation that they voluntarily
assumed, even at the expense of the firm’s future. Perhaps they regret doing so
now (as in all likelihood they do), but regret alone surely in not adequate moral
grounds for relieving someone of a moral obligation that they voluntarily
assumed.
Dependency
The third, and strongest, basis for the moral obligations we owe to future
generation communities is the very factor that is the foundation for the general
claim that past, present, and future generational communities may owe each
other obligations – dependency. What we minimally owe, as a moral matter, to
both deceased and unborn members of the various communities that nurture the
capabilities necessary for our flourishing, derives from our and their dependency
on each other. Specifically, the content of our and their obligations must relate
to their and our life-transcending projects and the fact that the fulfillment of
those projects is dependent upon the cooperation of others who come after us.
Those life-transcending projects and our dependency of future generations
for the realization of such projects provide the reference point for our moral
obligations to future generation communities. But that reference point is begui-
lingly robust. It means, or might be taken to mean, that our obligations include
providing the entire background infrastructure that is necessary for any such
project’s continuation or realization, i.e., all of the goods described above.
All of these background conditions – a reasonably clean environment,
well-functioning transportation and communication networks, a minimally
acceptable (both in terms of quality and distribution of health-care services)
health-care system – are circumstances that those in present-day generation
Intergenerational Communities 49
Brought to you by | Cornell University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/6/14 5:22 PM
communities take for granted. If, then, those present-day community members
expect, or at least hope, that their fellow community members in future genera-
tions will continue the life-transcending projects that the living members began,
it is incumbent on them to provide the same background conditions that they
enjoyed to those future community members to whom they transfer the respon-
sibility of continuing or fulfilling their life-transcending projects. That obligation
should apply to the extent that such background conditions are reasonably
necessary or facilitative for the implementation of the relevant projects. This is
a basis upon which we can explain Brian Barry’s equal-opportunity maxim: “[T]
he overall range of opportunities open to successor generations should not be
narrowed.”70
The obligation to provide the same background conditions that living com-
munity members enjoy to those future community members to whom they
transfer the responsibility of continuing or fulfilling their life-transcending pro-
jects is foundational and general. It serves as a broad basis upon which the
pursuit of life-transcending projects can be conducted, a necessary but not
always sufficient for such projects to continue beyond the lives of their creators.
Beyond this minimal obligation,71 what further obligations living commu-
nity members owe to future generation members will depend on the project that
living members pass on to their future co-members. Additional obligations must
be reasonably connected to the particular life-transcending projects in the sense
that the obligations are reasonably necessary for the project’s continued
70 Brian Barry, Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS 204, 243 (R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978).
71 Regarding the legal dimension of this minimal general obligation, the question is should
members of future generation communities have positive legal rights to such background
conditions. If they do have such rights, against whom would those rights be enforceable, at
what time(s) and by whom? The question of the timing of enforcement comes up because if the
rights are enforcement only when the future generation members come into existence, then it is
possible that the duty-bearers may no longer be available. The timing issue relates to the
question of the identity of the duty-bearer, or at least the identity of the party against whom
the right is enforceable. Specifically, are such positive rights enforceable against the state,
acting as the agent or representative of community members who are the real duty-holder?
Further questions exist. These positive rights, like all positive rights, pose problems concerning
the exact scope of the right: May the rights-holders demand that the duty-holder(s) take any and
all steps necessary to provide a clean environment, etc., or is it sufficient if the duty-holder puts
into place a reasonable policy or program designed to achieve a clean environment, etc., given
the financial and other constraints under which the duty-holder is acting? It is worth noting that
the latter is the approach that countries like the Republic of South Africa have taken in
interpreting the positive socio-economic rights provisions of their constitutions. See
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
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existence or fulfillment. We may think of these specific obligations as endow-
ments that support the life-transcending projects.
What might such endowments include? It depends, of course. Suppose, for
example, that the life-transcending project that a current generation community
member wishes her/his future community members to continue and advance to
the extent possible is a business that the current member created. S/he legally
transfers the business to her/his descendants at death, enjoining them to con-
tinue and grow the business. Should the business creator be morally obligated to
transfer to the recipients of the business with any additional resources by way of
an endowment to carry out that project? Of course, it is possible that there has
been some agreement or understanding between the transferor and the recipi-
ents, as we will see, and in that case the agreement should normally control the
parties’ obligations.
But suppose there is no such understanding. Does the transfer or owe the
transferees of her/his business an obligation to provide any sort of endowment
to support that business? This is not an easy question to answer, especially
given the transferor’s explicit injunction to the transferees to continue and
advance the business to the extent possible. Initially, we have to suppose that
the transferees accept the transfer, for donees are free, at least legally, to reject
attempted gratuitous transfers, both lifetime and at death.72 Assuming that the
transferees accept the bequest and assuming further that the testator’s injunc-
tion is merely precatory and creates no legal obligation, it may nevertheless
create a moral obligation on the transferees, who, after all, accepted the busi-
ness knowing of the testator’s injunction to them and its likely importance to
her/him. If such a moral obligation exists, a strong argument can be made that
the testator should provide the transferees with some sort of additional endow-
ment to the extent that additional resources are necessary to enable the trans-
ferees to fulfill their moral obligation to the testator. If additional resources are
needed to allow the transferee to carry out the testator’s injunction and the
testator provides no further support, the transferees must deplete their own
resources to do so. Of course, they could simply reject the bequest, but would
present them with a Hobson’s Choice: either accept the bequest with the con-
sequence that they must deplete their own resources to fulfill their moral
obligation to the testator or reject the bequest entirely (which has the undesir-
able side effect of frustrating the testator’s life-transcending interest). Fairness
seems to suggest reciprocity of moral obligations here. The moral obligation
on the transferees to fulfill, to the extent reasonably possible, the testator’s
72 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT SITKOFF, & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 152 (2009).
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injunction should they choose to accept the bequest should be matched by a
moral obligation on the testator to provide such resources as are reasonably
necessary to allow the transferees to fulfill their obligation to the transferee,
should they choose to accept the bequest. This approach maximizes the
likelihood that the testator’s wishes, particularly the continuation of her/his
life-transcending project, will be carried out and at the same time achieves
fairness between the testator and the transferees.
The Obligations Owed to More Remote Future Generational
Communities
Thus far, the future generational communities that I have considered have all
been foreseeable descendant generations – the generations of children and
grandchildren of creators of life-transcending projects. The more difficult aspect
of the general problem of future generational communities involves more remote
generations. Such generations pose more difficult questions because project
creators cannot expect to share a common life with such persons, at least not
in any literal sense.73 The problem is not simply that project creators will not
know persons who are more than three generations removed from them or vice
versa but, more fundamentally, that little connects living persons to such remote
future generations other than the most basic sorts of commonalities, notably
genetic ties and perhaps family names. Even those ties become more attenuated
with each generation removed.
Given such more attenuated connections, one may question whether such
remote future generations are members of the same generational communities
as the living at all. I previously indicated that community members share under-
standings of whom and what they are, and one might suppose that the attenua-
tion of ties between present and remotely future generation means that
such shared understandings will be lacking. At the same time, I indicated,
echoing Avner de-Shalit,74 that part of what constitutes communities is cultural
interaction75 and that cultural interaction includes shared traditions, which may
involve “historically extended, socially embodied argument[s]…”76 As Alasdair
73 See Martin P. Golding, Obligation to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS 61, 61–62 (Ernest Partridge ed., 1981).
74 See DE-SHALIT, supra note 26.
75 See supra 4.
76 MACINTYRE, supra note 32, at 222.
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MacIntyre observed, such arguments and such traditions may extend through
many generations.77
Assuming that the creator’s generational community includes remote future
generations, the question then becomes whether the same obligations that are
owed to relatively near generations also are owed to remote future generations.
Some years ago, Martin Golding argued that our obligations to future genera-
tions ought to be confined to our “immediate posterity”78 because we cannot
know what is good for them. We do not know what the condition of their lives
will be or even whether they share with us the same conception of the good life
for human beings.79 We would be well-advised, then, Golding, simply not to
plan for remote future generations.
Conceding Golding’s points regarding the lack of information about the
specific condition of the lives of remote future generation members and their
conception of the good life, it does not follow that the living owe them no moral
obligations whatsoever. The same problem may exist for some living persons
who are members of cultures that are far removed from and quite alien to ours,
but that fact does not warrant the conclusion that we owe no moral obligations
to them. We owe such persons moral obligations by virtue of their humanity.
Regardless of the specific conditions of their existence, members of remote
future generations share with us certain basic features that are inherent in the
human condition – the abilities to love and to enjoy; vulnerability to pain,
suffering, and ultimately, death; self-consciousness; and so on.80 Given these
fundamental commonalities, the moral norms of equality and human dignity
suggest that, although differences may exist between the moral obligations that
we owe members of immediate future generational communities and their
remote counterparts, we owe members of our remote future generational com-
munities at least minimal moral obligations.
Nevertheless, our lack of information about remote future generational
communities and their attenuated relationship to the living do have a bearing
upon the content of our obligations to them. Golding’s point that we cannot plan
for such persons seems correct as far as it goes. It bears upon the basis of both
types of obligations I have described, the GO and the SO, i.e., dependency.
Although some degree of dependency may still exist between the living and the
fellow community members three or more generations into the future, the extent
77 Id.
78 See Golding, supra note 73, at 70.
79 Id.
80 See Gregory Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note
73, at 109, 112–13.
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of that dependency is likely to be substantially more attenuated than it is
between living community members and their counterparts one generation
ahead. At any rate, we cannot possibly predict just how much dependency
will exist or what its character will be as we move three or more generations
into the future. For this reason, the obligations that living creators of life-
transcending projects owe to remote future generational community members
must be of a more basic sort. The obligations should be aimed at constituting a
framework within which members of remote future generational communities
who wish to continue life-transcending projects transmitted to them may do so,
a background that enables such individuals to pursue these projects, if they so
choose. This background condition consists of certain of the fundamental cap-
abilities discussed in Part I, among these the capabilities of health, personal
security, and freedom.
A more concrete statement this background must take into account the
possible effects, allocative but especially distributive, of norms that would
affirmatively seek to assure that resources are available to remote future gen-
erations. This is, of course, a familiar problem in discussions on intergenera-
tional justice.81 The problem is complex, for it involves two uncertain variables,
first, increasing scarcity of resources over the future, and second, the contin-
gency of future generational communities. This is not the proper occasion for
anything like a full analysis of the distributive problem, but a few comments on
these two variables will indicate why caution is appropriate in mapping out a
specific account of the background condition.
With regard to future scarcity, the dilemma posed by uncertainty is this:
Whether economic growth can be sustained in a finite natural world is one of the
most persistent questions in economic literature. The unprecedented rate of
consumption of natural resources and the concomitant effects have given rise
to acute concern with sustainability, a term that has come to be closely asso-
ciated with intergenerational justice in the relevant literatures. Because the
growth in the rate of consumption has been exponential, the fear is that relevant
consumption rates at some future point will swamp production rates, leading to
potentially catastrophic results.
But this scenario is far from certain. We cannot categorically exclude the
possibility that human creativity will ameliorate increased scarcity. After all, in
the past, humans have proved to be quite adept at finding solutions to the
problem of scarce natural resources. Repeatedly, they have developed new
81 See, e.g., id; Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?, in
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS supra note 73, at 73.
54 G. S. Alexander
Brought to you by | Cornell University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/6/14 5:22 PM
technologies that economize on scarce natural resources or that allow the use of
resources that were previously uneconomical. There is no obvious reason to
think that this pattern will not continue, allowing us not merely to avoid passing
on to remote future generations a greatly degraded and depleted environment
but to transmit a set of conditions that is at least as good as what we currently
enjoy (thereby satisfying a future generational counterpart to the Lockean
proviso82).
Which scenario will transpire? We cannot know, of course, and that is
precisely the problem. For if we are to develop anything like a concrete
account of the background condition that we owe to members of our remote
future generational communities, we must have some idea of what the prob-
able state of resources available to such future persons is. In the absence of
that basic information, we simply cannot specify our obligation in any sort
detail.
The second variable of uncertainty is the contingency of future genera-
tions. This contingency is not simply a matter of when but of whether –
members of our future generational communities may not exist at all. Their
existence depends, to a considerable extent, upon decisions that living mem-
bers make. How does this existential uncertainty affect the moral obligations
that living community members owe to potential members in the future?
Gregory Kavka poses a useful analogy.83 Imagine, he suggests, a poor couple
that has some children and is contemplating have more. The question is
whether they should treat the prospective children as being on a par with
their living children with respect to the consumption of their resources, i.e., by
conserving resources for unborn children. Kavka’s answer is that they should
not if doing so would cause the living children to suffer serious deprivation.84
This answer seems to me to be the right one. The living have moral obligations
to living members of their communities, and those obligations must be met
first. This is not to say that the living owe no obligations to conserve resources
for future generational members, including remote future generations. The
point is one of priority – under conditions of scarcity, priority in the distribu-
tion of resources must be given to existing resource consumers. Moreover, the
more remotely in the future the generational members are, the weaker the
moral obligation that the living owe to them.
82 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge UP, 1988) (1690).
83 Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 109,
supra note 73, at 114..
84 Id.
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The Contingency of Our Obligations to Unborn Communities
Grounding our obligations to future generational communities on dependency
between generations, i.e., the dependency of the living generation upon their
future generational counterparts to carry on life-transcending projects, seemingly
makes those obligations contingent in a way that other bases for such obligations
do not.85 The apparent vulnerability of the obligations to future generations on this
account results from an implied advance deal between the generational commu-
nities: The living will provide the future counterparts with a clean environment, a
well-functioning infrastructure, a reasonable efficient economy, and minimally
acceptable health-care system in exchange for future generations’ reasonable
efforts to carry out the life-transcending projects of their forebears. This may be a
troubling conclusion to some who think that our obligations to transfer such a
material foundation to future generation should be unconditional and uncon-
strained. From one perspective, the dependency theory looks like a hold-up.
More fundamentally, the theory seemingly encroaches upon future generations’
autonomy interest in creating their own lives and the conditions of those lives.
This concern, although understandable, does not, I think, fundamentally
undermine the dependency theory. The reason is that it misconstrues the char-
acter of the obligation to provide the background material conditions necessary
to carry forward any and all life-transcending projects, i.e., the GO. That obliga-
tion is general, and because it is general it applies unconditionally, that is, to all
members of all members of foreseeable future generations. That is what distin-
guishes the GO from the SO.
To be sure, the GO is still more limited than the broadly redistributive
account offered by some rights theorists.86 Its principle aim is not redistribution
as such, and even as to the GO (certainly as to the SO) contingency still exists.
But contingency is an inescapable aspect of the human condition. No one can
guarantee future conditions of the world. There are too many variables over
which we have little or no control. Weather conditions may change catastrophi-
cally for non-man-made reasons (as best as science can presently tell), globali-
zation of financial markets may produce long-term economic depressions over
which any single nation has little control, global changes in population and
immigration (legal and illegal) – all of these possible future scenarios may
seriously affect the ability of any generation to transmit to future generations
stable and decent material conditions and structures. All that the living can
commit themselves to do for future generations is to make reasonable efforts,
85 I am grateful to Hanoch Dagan for raising this point.
86 See supra note 2.
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under whatever circumstances happen to prevail at the given time, to transmit
decent minimal material conditions. Admittedly, that commitment is limited,
and it leaves future generations with risks. But that is the most the living can, or
at least should, promise the unborn.
Conclusion
The living do owe moral obligations to unborn members of their communities,
but those obligations are limited. They are limited in multiple ways, including
the basis, or source, or the obligations, and the distance between the presently
living members and unborn members. The basis of the obligations is rooted in
the idea of what I have called life-transcending projects: the desire that living
persons have in seeing that certain projects or interests of theirs be carried on
after their deaths. This basis of the obligation helps define the range of persons,
resources, and precise nature of the obligations. Moreover, the obligations that
the living owe to future generational communities generally weaken as the
distance between the living and the unborn increases. In an environment of
uncertainty and scarce resources, our first and greatest moral obligation regard-
ing the distribution of resources is to those members of our communities who
are living with us and who continue to nurture the capabilities necessary for us
to flourish. The second priority should be given to the future generational
communities who come immediately after us, for the relevant ties between
those generations usually will be relatively strong. The further out generational
line stretches, the weaker our obligations become.
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